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TAKING SECTION 10(B) SERIOUSLY:
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF SEC RULES
Steve Thel*
This Article examines the role of section 10(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in public and private en-
forcement actions. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") promulgated Rule 10b-5 with little fanfare. Alt-
hough Rule 10b-5 was intended to be a limited expansion of
the Exchange Act, it now dominates securities litigation, both
public and private.
The Supreme Court has reflexively used section 10(b) to
determine the contours of private action under Rule 10b-5.
The Court has interpreted section 10(b) as either prohibiting
certain conduct or authorizing the SEC to regulate a limited
scope of conduct. This Article argues that this interpretation
is not consistent with the language, structure, or legislative
history of the Exchange Act.
By interpreting section 10(b) in this manner, the Court has
created causes of action that have no basis in the Exchange
Act, including the fraud on the market class action. Congress
has often rejected the Court's approach to section 10(b), or at
least failed to ratify its decisions, as it has done with the
fraud on the market class action. This Article argues that the
Court should revisit its decisions under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 and eliminate the fraud on the market class ac-
tion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most important provision of the securities laws is not
in any federal securities statute. It is Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC" or "the Commission") Rule 10b-5,
adopted quietly and without any expectation that it would
become very important. Nevertheless, Rule 10b-51 has be-
come one of the best-known provisions of American law. "[I]t
is difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpus
juris in which the interaction of the legislative, administra-
tive rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced so
much from so little."2
The Supreme Court set out its approach to Rule 10b-5
almost forty years ago in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.' Alt-
hough the Court held that in a private action for a violation
of Rule 10b-5 a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted
with scienter, it did not pay much attention to Rule 10b-5.
Instead, it focused on the language of section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act (the "Exchange Act"),' because "[t]he
starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself."5 The Court underscored the cen-
trality of section 10(b) in its response to the argument that
the language of the rule covers negligent behavior:6
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
2 7 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 498 (4th ed. 2006).
3 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
5 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)).
6 Four years later, in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Court
itself held that negligent conduct is covered by the second and third claus-
es of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), the language of
2 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2014
Rule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority grant-
ed the Commission under § 10(b). The rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency charged
with the administration of a federal statute is not the
power to make law. Rather, it is "the power to adopt
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
expressed by the statute." Thus, despite the broad
view of the Rule advanced . . . in this case, its scope
cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by
Congress under § 10(b).
The Court has continued to follow the approach of Hoch-
felder, consciously focusing on the language of section 10(b)
instead of Rule lOb-5 to determine whether the rule prohib-
its certain conduct." Often the Court is quite clumsy in read-
which is used in Rule 10b-5. See Hoch/elder, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32; see also
infra Part IV.
7 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-14 (citations omitted).
8 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881
(2010) ("Rule 10b-5 . . . does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by §
10(b)'s prohibition." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); United
States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-54 (1997); Cent. Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1994) ("In our cas-
es addressing § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we . . . have refused to allow 10b-5
challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute."); id. at 175;
id. at 177 ("It is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to
extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory
text."); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1980) (emphasizing the pri-
macy of "the plain meaning of the language of § 10(b)"); Chiarella v. Unit-
ed States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 471-72 (1977) ("In holding that a cause of action under Rule 10b-5
does not lie for mere negligence [in Hochfelder], the Court began with the
principle that '[a]scertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
standard of liability created by a particular section of the [1933 and 1934]
Acts must . . . rest primarily on the language of that section,' and then fo-
cused on the statutory language of § 10(b) . ... The same language and
the same principle apply to this case." (citation omitted)); cf. SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002) ("The scope of Rule 10b-5 is coex-
tensive with the coverage of § 10(b); therefore, we use § 10(b) to refer to
both the statutory provision and the Rule." (citations omitted)).
While the Court has focused on the language of section 10(b) in deter-
mining the scope of prohibited conduct, it has considered external sources,
including policy, in defining the elements and parameters of the private
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ing section 10(b). The Court's reading is unfortunately ex-
emplified by Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc.,9 in which the Court rejected scheme liabil-
ity under Rule 10b-5, notwithstanding the language of the
rule that makes it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud."10 According to Stoneridge, there is no
such liability because section 10(b) does not prohibit this
conduct, and "Rule 10b-5 encompasses only conduct already
prohibited by § 10(b)."11
Stoneridge, however, was wrong about section 10(b). The
Court apparently thought that the language of section 10(b)
justified its blunt statement, inasmuch as it made the state-
ment at the beginning of its discussion and immediately af-
ter quoting the statute and the rule. As the Court put it:
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it
"unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange . . . to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty ... any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors." 12
On any reading, it is clear that nothing is "already pro-
hibited" by section 10(b). Instead, section 10(b) makes un-
lawful, or prohibits, certain conduct only if it contravenes an
right of action for violations of the rule. See infra note 96 and accompany-
ing text.
9 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a).
11 552 U.S. 157 (2008).
12 Id. at 156. The scope of section 10(b) extends to some instruments
that are not securities. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 amended section 10(b) to extend its coverage to "any securities-based
swap agreement." Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 303(d), 114 Stat. 2763. Such
swaps are not securities. Exchange Act § 3A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1(b)
(2012).
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SEC rule. In other words, absent a rule, section 10(b) does
not prohibit anything. Even when there is a rule, it is the
rule that prohibits conduct-section 10(b) does not come into
play unless some conduct violates a rule. All section 10(b)
does is make the rule violation unlawful. It turns out that,
under the Exchange Act, a great deal turns on whether the
conduct that contravenes a rule is unlawful or just prohibit-
ed.13
While Stoneridge echoed other Supreme Court opinions
that have said that Rule 10b-5 prohibits only conduct that
section 10(b) itself prohibits,14 the Court has not always been
so clumsy, or at least not so clumsy in the same way. Some-
times it has read section 10(b) to grant the SEC rulemaking
power, but only power to regulate manipulative or deceptive
devices or contrivances." This interpretation, however, is
also wrong. The Exchange Act explicitly grants the Commis-
13 See infra Part II.
14 See, e.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 816; The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v.
United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 589-90 (2001) ("§ 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 ... prohibits using 'any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance' 'in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."'); O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (1997) ("Liability under Rule
10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct encom-
passed by § 10(b)'s prohibition."); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) ("We have refused to allow 10b-5
challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute."); Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) ("Section
10(b) outlaws the use 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of any secu-
rity of 'any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."').
15 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("[D]espite the broad view of the Rule ad-
vanced . .. in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under § 10(b)."); see also infra note 83 (listing
cases in which the Supreme Court said that the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5
pursuant to section 10(b)). In these cases, the Court seems to have as-
sumed that Rule 10b-5 prohibits everything that section 10(b) allows it to
prohibit, treating the rule as "a sort of long-arm provision in which the
SEC forbids everything the statute gives it power to forbid." Steve Thel,
The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990); see also Zandford, 535 U.S. at 816 n.1 ("The
scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the coverage of § 10(b) . . . .").
No. I:1]) 5
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sion ample rulemaking power elsewhere.' 6 Section 10(b) re-
fers to rules prescribed by the SEC and provides for their en-
forcement, but it does not authorize the SEC to make rules.
Moreover, inasmuch as all the conduct that the Court says is
manipulative or deceptive is wrongful and harmful, if section
10(b) were about making law, Congress presumably would
have just prohibited it directly, rather than leaving it to SEC
regulation."
If section 10(b) controls the scope of federal securities
regulation, we should take section 10(b) seriously." The Su-
preme Court has been wrong about section 10(b) since it de-
cided Hochfelder. This Article offers a different reading of
section 10(b). It shows that judging by the language, struc-
ture, and history of the Exchange Act, section 10(b) simply
subjects a subset of SEC rule violations to criminal sanc-
tions. Section 10(b) does not confer rulemaking power on the
SEC, but it also does not limit the SEC's rulemaking power
or enforcement of its rules.
The key to understanding section 10(b) lies in the Ex-
change Act's sanctioning scheme. The SEC can enforce any
of its rules in court or administrative proceedings: Criminal
sanctions, by contrast, are available for only some rules-
specifically for rules "the violation of which is made unlawful
or the observance of which is required under the terms of'
the Act.1 9 Section 10(b) triggers this criminal sanction by
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) ("The Commission ... shall ... have pow-
er to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to implement the provisions of this title for which [it is] responsible or for
the execution of the functions vested in [it] by this title . . . ."); see also in-
fra Parts III & IV.
17 Indeed, when Rule 10b-5 was adopted, section 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), already directly prohibited most of the conduct
that Rule 10b-5 prohibited. See infra Part IV.
18 It is not the purpose of this Article to defend or recommend textual
interpretation of the Exchange Act generally or of section 10(b) particular-
ly. The story told here is largely a cautionary one about the problems the
Supreme Court has encountered in one of its most sustained textualist
undertakings, and how its interpretation of section 10(b) to determine the
law of Rule 10b-5 is wrong.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
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making it "unlawful" to use manipulative or deceptive devic-
es or contrivances in contravention of SEC rules. The crimi-
nalization of certain rule violations is an important function,
but one very different from the function the Supreme Court
assumes section 10(b) serves. The Court had it backward in
Hochfelder when it looked for a limitation on Rule 10b-5 in
"the power granted the Commission by Congress under §
10(b)." 20 Rule 10b-5 does not implement section 10(b); sec-
tion 10(b) implements Rule 10b-5.2 1
Part II of this Article outlines the sanctions available un-
der the Exchange Act for enforcing the Act and rules adopted
thereunder. It shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
not all SEC rules are subject to criminal enforcement, and
illustrates how section 10(b) is part of an elegant mechanism
designed to limit criminal enforcement of the rules. Part III
discusses the SEC's extraordinarily broad rulemaking power
under the Exchange Act. Part IV briefly recounts the adop-
tion of Rule 10b-5, clarifying its statutory basis and the lim-
ited expansion of the law it was intended to secure. Part V
begins to disentangle section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. It shows
that the administration of the securities laws can be regular-
ized and the public interest furthered if courts and regula-
tors recognize distinctions between public and private en-
forcement of Rule 10b-5 that are implicit in the statute,
notwithstanding that the private action is a judicial creation.
The Supreme Court should take responsibility for the private
right of action and consider substantially restricting causes
of action that it created. On the other hand, inasmuch as
section 10(b) has little to do with the SEC, the Court's re-
strictive holdings in Rule 10b-5 cases should not apply to en-
forcement actions brought by the Commission, but only to
20 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-14 (citations omitted).
21 As much as this is at odds with the conventional understanding of
section 10(b), it is just an example of a New Deal legislative convention
that employed "rulemaking grants coupled with a statutory provision im-
posing sanctions on those who violate the rules." Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARv. L. REV. 467, 469 (2002); see infra note 69 (discuss-
ing Merrill & Watts' treatment of the Exchange Act).
No. I:1]1 7
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private and, sometimes, criminal actions. For the same rea-
son, the Court's consistent and insistent rejection of the
SEC's interpretation of section 10(b) turns out to be oddly
principled. Part V concludes by showing that Congress has
repeatedly rejected the Court's approach to section 10(b),
which cannot withstand extension to other well-established
parts of the statutory regulatory scheme.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF RULES UNDER THE
EXCHANGE ACT
While the Exchange Act directly forbids some conduct-
primarily acting in various capacities without registering
with the SEC first 2 2-it generally foregoes direct statutory
regulation in favor of regulation by the SEC. This approach
was a concession to the securities industry, which insisted
that rigid rules contained in a statute would be unsuitable
for complicated and evolving practices. Led by the New York
Stock Exchange, the industry urged Congress to reject the
original proposals for stock market reform and instead create
a new regulator with plenary rulemaking power.23 Congress
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3 (engaging in security-based swaps not cleared
through registered clearing agency); see id. § 78c-5 (accepting funds from
security-based swap customers without registering as broker or dealer);
see id. § 78e (effecting transactions on unregistered exchange); see id. §
78f(h) (trading in unregistered security futures products); see id. § 78i
(prohibiting certain manipulative acts); see id. § 78k (prohibiting exchange
member's trading on exchange for own account); see id. § 78k-1(b) (acting
as securities information processor without registration); see id. § 781
(trading unregistered securities on exchange); see id. § 78n(e) (prohibiting
the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with tender of-
fers); see id. § 78o(a) (acting as broker or dealer without registration); see
id. § 78o(e) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive devices by bro-
kers and dealers); see id. § 78o-4 (acting as municipal securities dealer
without registration); see id. § 78o-5 (acting as government securities bro-
ker or dealer without registration); see id. § 78o-10 (acting as security-
based swap dealer without registration); see id. § 78p(c) (prohibiting sales
against the box by insiders); see id. § 78q-1 (acting as clearing agency
without registration); see id. § 78dd-1 (foreign bribes); see id. § 78dd-3 (for-
eign trade practices).
23 See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 6 (1934) ("Representatives of the
stock exchanges constantly urged a greater degree of flexibility in the
ultimately agreed, concluding, in the words of Hochfelder,
"that efficient regulation of securities trading could not be
accomplished under a rigid statutory program."24 Thus, the
Exchange Act "merely specifies the practice or type of trans-
actions to be regulated, and indicates the objective to be
gained. Within the statutory limitations, the scope of these
qualified or conditional prohibitions is determined by the
rules and regulations . . . ."2
The Exchange Act established a menu of options for en-
forcing the statute and the SEC's rules. For a long time, in-
junctive relief was the primary enforcement mechanism
available to the SEC.26 The Exchange Act provides that
statute and insisted that the complicated nature of the problems justified
leaving much greater latitude of discretion with the administrative agen-
cies than would otherwise be the case. It is for that reason that the bill in
dealing with a number of difficult problems singles out these problems as
matters appropriate to be subject to restrictive rules and regulation, but
leaves to the administrative agencies the determination of the most ap-
propriate form of rule or regulation to be enforced."); Whitney Proposes A
Federal Board on Stock Trading-Favors a Stock Exchange Coordinating
Authority with Plenary Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1934, at 1, col. 5
(Richard Whitney was president of the New York Stock Exchange); Press
Release, N.Y. Board of Trade (Apr. 12, 1934) (announcing Board's unani-
mous resolution proposing a Stock Exchange Coordinating Authority with
"plenary powers with respect to all necessary rules and regulations that
will prevent fraudulent practices, the use of excessive credit for security
speculation, and the manipulation of security prices."), quoted in Thel, su-
pra note 15, at 441 n.252. See generally id. (discussing substitution of ple-
nary rulemaking power for statutory restrictions in response to insistence
of securities industry).
24 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
25 William B. Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139, 169 (1934); see also JOEL SELIGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 100 (3d ed. 2003) (observing that
debate over enactment of Exchange Act was generally resolved by confer-
ring rulemaking power on the SEC).
26 See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of the Task Force on
SEC Settlements, 47 Bus. LAw. 1087, 1098 (1992) [hereinafter SEC Task
Force Report] ("Injunctive relief has been the SEC's principal enforcement
remedy under the express provisions of the federal securities laws, tradi-
tionally regarded as the 'remedy of choice' for the Commission.").
No. 1: 1] TAKING SECTION 10O(B) SER10USL Y 9
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or
practices constituting a violation of any provision of
this title, the rules or regulations thereunder [or the
rules of self-regulatory organizations] . . . it may in
its discretion bring an action . . . to enjoin such acts
or practices. 27
The SEC has the same power to obtain injunctive relief for
violations of the rules it promulgates under the Exchange
Act as it has for violations of the Exchange Act itself.
In 1990, the Exchange Act was amended to allow the SEC
to.seek civil money penalties in court "[w]henever it shall
appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is
about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation
of any provision of [the Exchange Act], the rules or regula-
tions thereunder," or in some cases, the rules of self-
regulatory organizations. 28  Here again, violations of the
statute and rules are treated alike, and civil money penalties
are available for the violation of any Exchange Act rule.
As originally enacted, the Exchange Act also authorized
the SEC to impose administrative sanctions in certain cir-
cumstances, 2 9 and it has been amended repeatedly to afford
the Commission a range of administrative sanctions.3 0 Once
again, the Exchange Act does not distinguish between statu-
tory provisions and rules, and thus the Commission's admin-
istrative sanctions are available to enforce all its rules.
27 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d); see also id. § 78u(e) (granting court jurisdiction
for violation of all rules); cf. id. § 78t(e) (allowing SEC to obtain injunctions
against those who aid and abet the violation "of any rule or regulation").
28 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3); see Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 201, 104 Stat 931,
935 (1990).
29 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 19, 48 Stat. 881, 898 (1934) (since amend-
ed) (suspension of exchange or security registration).
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (discipline of broker-dealers); see id. §
78u-2(a) (civil penalties in certain administrative proceedings for willful
violations of "the rules or regulations" under the Exchange Act); see id. §
78u-3(a) (cease and desist orders for violations of "any rule or regulation"
under the Exchange Act).
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Finally, the Exchange Act provides for criminal enforce-
ment in section 32.31 Although criminal proceedings were
not intended to be the primary enforcement mechanism, they
are of course very important.3 2 The criminal sanction provi-
sion of the Exchange Act, however, is very different from the
civil and administrative enforcement provisions. While crim-
inal penalties are available for willful violation of any section
of the statute (except one provision dealing with foreign
bribes),3 3 they are available for only a subset of SEC rules.
The leading treatise on securities regulation reflects con-
ventional wisdom when it says that it is a crime to violate
any rule adopted by the SEC under the Exchange Act willful-
ly. 34 In fact, however, while every provision of the Exchange
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. The Exchange Act expressly provides some
private remedies. See, e.g., id. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r. With the exception of
section 16(b), which allows for the recovery of short-swing trading profits
from some corporate insiders, these express remedies have not proven im-
portant. Moreover, the section 16(b) remedy is not for a violation of the
Act. The short-swing trading for which it affords a remedy is not prohibit-
ed, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ may enforce section 16(b). In any
event, the statutorily expressed private remedies do not empower private
parties to recover for rule violations. The judicially created implied pri-
vate action for violations of Rule 10b-5, on the other hand, is extremely
important.
32 See Herlands, supra note 25, at 144-45.
33 The excluded statutory provision, Exchange Act § 30A, 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-1, was added to the Exchange Act by the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494, 1495, which also
amended section 32 to exclude the provision from criminal sanction there-
under. See id. § 103(b)(1).
34 See 10 Loss, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 412; see also
JOHN C. COFFEE & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 1499 (12th ed.
2012) (It is "a felony for any person 'willfully' to violate any statutory pro-
vision of [the Securities Act or the Exchange Act] or any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder. Any SEC rule or regulation . . . can support a
criminal prosecution .... ); JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD
C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION 863 (6th ed. 2009) ("[It is a]crime
for any person to 'willfully' violate .. . any rule or regulation promulgated"
under the Exchange Act); Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and
Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: the Case of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1040-41 (2001)
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Act but one may be enforced with criminal sanctions, not all
rules are enforceable criminally. Instead, criminal sanctions
extend only to the willful violation of "any rule or regulation
[under the Exchange Act] the violation of which is made un-
lawful or the observance of which is required under the
terms of' the Act.3 5
The awkward language of section 10(b) becomes clear
when read against the equally awkward language of section
32.36 Recall that section 10(b) literally only provides that
certain conduct in contravention of SEC rules "shall be un-
lawful."3 7  Calling something unlawful usually does not do
very much. Murder, speeding, and breaking a contract are
all unlawful acts, but the law treats them very differently.
The consequence of unlawfulness is what matters. 38 Section
32 provides the consequences for rule violations that section
10(b) makes unlawful-criminal sanctions. By making the
use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances in
contravention of an SEC rule "unlawful," section 10(b) trig-
gers criminal sanctions under section 32, which apply to
rules whose violation is made "unlawful" by the Exchange
(criminal actions "can rest on the violation of any prohibition in the Ex-
change Act and its accompanying rules and regulations").
35 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). The Exchange Act's treatment of criminal pen-
alties for rule violations differs from that of the Securities Act of 1933,
which subjects willful violations of any rule promulgated under that Act to
criminal penalty. See id. § 77x. When the Exchange Act was enacted, the
difference-in statutes created by the same committees and enacted by
the same Congress-was noted as evidence that Congress intended to lim-
it the range of rules subject to criminal prosecution under the Exchange
Act. See Herlands, supra note 25, at 143-44.
36 Cf. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988) ("Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor. A pro-
vision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the re-
mainder of the statutory scheme.").
37 See supra text accompanying note 13.
38 See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (11th Cir.
2013) (holding that violation of a regulation could not be basis of criminal
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006), which covers importation "con-
trary to law"); cf. Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 1219 (2013) (using "ille-
gal" as synonym for "unlawful" in Investment Advisers Act Section 206, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6).
Act. The "[i]t shall be unlawful .. . to . . ." language in sec-
tion 10(b) is shorthand for "[i]t shall be a crime punishable
upon conviction by fine of not more than $5,000,000, or im-
prisonment of not more than 20 years if the defendant does
not prove that he had no knowledge of the rule, or both, or
fine not exceeding $25,000,000 in the case of a person other
than a natural person, to . ...
The language of section 32 limiting criminal sanctions to
a subset of rules was not a drafting glitch. Rather, it was the
product of considerable legislative attention to widely held
concerns about the propriety of granting an administrative
agency license to create new crimes. Its inclusion was a con-
dition for the criminalization of rule violations.4 0 The first
versions of what became the Exchange Act would have made
the willful violation of any Commission rule a crime subject
to fine and imprisonment.4 1 Critics of these proposals ar-
gued that no administrative agency should be granted broad
power to define crimes.4 2 The bill subsequently passed by
39 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
40 See Herlands, supra note 25, at 171-73; Thel, supra note 15, at
456-59. When the Exchange Act was enacted, there were substantial
questions about the extent to which Congress could allow an administra-
tive agency to make conduct criminal. See Herlands, supra note 25, at
169-71. It is also noteworthy that the criminal sanctions of section 32 do
not reach self-regulatory organization rules, which the SEC can enforce in
civil proceedings. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Enforc-
ing privately promulgated rules with criminal sanctions might have
seemed particularly problematic in 1934. The next year, the Supreme
Court found delegation of rulemaking power to private entities unconstitu-
tional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
41 See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong. § 24 (1934); H.R. 8720, 73d Cong. § 25
(1934); H.R. 9323, 73d Cong. § 32 (1934); S. 2693, 73d Cong. § 24 (1934);
see also Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97
(73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 6576 (1934) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testi-
mony of Thomas Corcoran describing provision); id. at 6640 (testimony of
Richard Whitney, President, NYSE).
42 See, e.g., id., at 7562 (testimony of Roland Redmond, counsel to
NYSE) (referring to an earlier version of what became section 10(b) as "a
general grant of [rulemaking authority] to the [FTC] to define as a crime
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the House of Representatives limited criminal enforcement
of rules to those "the violation of which is made unlawful un-
der the terms of this Act."43 The Senate then approved its
own bill, which allowed all rules to be enforced by injunction,
subjected willful violations of the statute to fine and impris-
onment, and subjected willful violations of any rule to fine
alone.44 The enacted compromise subjected rule and statute
violations to the same criminal sanctions-fine and impris-
onment-but restricted criminal sanctions to rules "the vio-
lation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which
is required under the terms of' the Act.45 It also added the
unusual provision that no one may be imprisoned for a rule
violation if he proves he was ignorant of the rule, further ev-
any practice which they thought was manipulative, [which] seemed to us
to be an altogether too broad grant of power to an administrative body.");
id. at 7572 ("We firmly believe that the criminal penalties of the bill ought
to be restricted to what are really in their nature crimes, and not viola-
tions of rules and regulations . . . ."); id. at 6965 (testimony of Howard
Butcher, Jr., of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange) ("[H]e would become
immediately become subject to a $25,000 fine and/or a 10-year jail sen-
tence ... for violating, perhaps entirely unwittingly, some provisions of the
rules and regulations. . . ."); id. at 7022 (statement of New York Airbrake
Co.) (fine and imprisonment for rule violations "is revolting to the sense of
justice and fair play of all of us"); cf. 78 Cong. Rec. 8112 (1934) (statement
of Rep. John Cooper) ("It is doubtful whether ever in the history of Con-
gress such a wide and sweeping delegation has been given to any adminis-
trative body to create by rule and regulation crimes punishable by severe
fine and imprisonment. . . .").
43 H.R. 9323, 73d Cong. § 32 (1934); see also 78 CONG. REc. 8116-17
(1934).
44 See S. 3420, 73d Cong. § 30 (1934); H.R. 9323 § 30 (as passed with
the amendment of the Senate); see also S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)
("[Aiccordingly the bill provides criminal penalties for violation of such
rules and regulations. It is to be noted, however, that such penalties are
limited to fines as distinguished from the penalties of imprisonment which
may be inflicted for violation of the statutory provisions of the bill."); id. at
23-24.
45 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012); see also H.R. REP. No. 73-1838, at 38 (1934)
(Conf. Rep.) ("The substitute contains substantially the House provision
[which reached rules the violation of which is made unlawful] except that
it is made clear that it is to apply to violations of rules or regulations the
observance of which is required . . . .").
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idencing Congress' caution about criminal enforcement of
administratively promulgated rules.46 Contemporaneous
commentators recognized that section 32 limited criminal
penalties to a subset of rules, and it does not appear that an-
yone ever suggested that all willful rule violations were sub-
. . .47ject to criminal sanction.
Recognizing that section 10(b) is about criminal sanctions
helps explain some of the more curious aspects of securities
regulation. For example, the limited scope of section 10(b)
explains the paucity of direct references to section 10(b) in
the legislative history of the Exchange Act.48 Ironically, sec-
tion 10(b) is characterized as providing a sanction, not as
creating rulemaking power, in the only congressional com-
mittee report that the Supreme Court has found relevant:
The legislative reports do not address the scope of §
10 (b) ... directly ... . The only specific reference to
§ 10 ... is the following:
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic pow-
ers conferred on the administrative authority, ef-
fective regulation must include several clear stat-
utory provisions reinforced by penal and civil
sanctions, aimed at those manipulative and de-
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
47 During floor debate over the House bill, Republican Representative
John Cooper criticized the extension of criminal sanctions to rule viola-
tions and listed the various provisions that triggered criminal sanctions by
declaring the violation of a rule unlawful. 78 CONG. REC. 8112 (1934).
Shortly after the Exchange Act was enacted, William Herlands, writing in
the Virginia Law Review, noted that "[t]he penal provision . . . is confined
to those rules and regulations 'the violation of which is made unlawful or
the observance of which is required under the terms' of the statute. The
obvious purpose of this restriction is to narrow the area of criminal con-
duct. [The provisions permitting injunctive and administrative enforce-
ment of any rule] bring out in sharp relief the restriction in the penal pro-
vision and the Congressional intent in that regard." Herlands, supra note
25, at 172-73 (emphasis in original).
48 The Supreme Court has emphasized the absence of direct legisla-
tive history. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204-05
(1976). See generally Thel, supra note 15 (detailing legislative history of
section 10(b)).
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ceptive practices which have been demonstrated
to fulfill no useful function. These sanctions are
found in sections 9, 10 and 16." 4
Section 32's requirement that a rule be identified else-
where in the statute before criminal sanctions can attach al-
so helps explain this section's minimal mens rea require-
ment. Criminal sanctions may be imposed on anyone who
"willfully violates" the statute or covered rule, which has
been held to require "only that 'the prosecution establishes a
realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a
wrongful act."'50  Inasmuch as most provisions of the Ex-
change Act are triggered only by rule violations-and most
of the rules are extraordinarily dense and obscure-students
of securities regulation are often surprised to conclude that a
person may be subject to criminal sanction for violating a
rule he has never heard of if the government can make the
minimal showing that the defendant realized he was doing
wrong. However, section 32 does not only rely on the de-
fendant's state of mind to limit the conduct that is subject to
criminal sanction, but also on the requirement that the rule
at issue be identified in another provision of the statute.
Some of those provisions further limit the rule violations
subject to criminal sanctions, as section 10(b) does by condi-
tioning unlawfulness, and thus criminal sanction, on the de-
fendant's use of a manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance. Others, such as the provisions relating to SEC
reports and proxy statements 5 1 identify rules that apply in
situations that people likely know are subject to intricate
regulation.52
49 Hoch/elder, 425 U.S. at 204 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)
(emphasis supplied)).
50 United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting Her-
lands, supra note 25, at 149); see also United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d
1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976).
51 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a).
52 Section 32's limitation on the rules subject to criminal sanction ap-
parently informed the judicial development of a relaxed standard of "will-
fulness." Most courts have followed the standard articulated by Judge
Friendly in Peltz, 433 F.2d at 55, and Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395. As noted
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Since criminal violations of the Exchange Act and its
rules are prosecuted by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"),5 3
section 10(b) has little significance for the SEC within the
structure of the statute. To illustrate, suppose that Rule
10b-5 was called something else, for example "Rule 105."
The Commission could adopt the rule without reliance on
section 10(b) under the broad rulemaking power conferred by
section 23(a) of the Exchange Act. 54 If someone violated the
renamed Rule 105, the SEC could obtain an injunction or
administrative sanction for the violation, and would not have
to prove a violation of, or, for that matter, cite, any substan-
tive provision of the Exchange Act, let alone section 10(b).
After all, under the Exchange Act, civil and administrative
remedies are available for the violation of any rule.
Only if criminal sanctions were sought would it be neces-
sary to identify a provision of the Exchange Act requiring ob-
servance of the rule or making its violation unlawful. For a
violation of Rule 10b-5--or imaginary Rule 105-the identi-
fied provision would presumably be section 10(b). The SEC
would never have to identify such a provision, however, since
the U.S. Attorney would prosecute a criminal case. Moreo-
ver, to secure a conviction on the basis of section 10(b), the
government would have to show not merely that the defend-
ant violated the rule, as the SEC would have to do in a civil
below, Judge Friendly was almost uniquely cognizant among judges of sec-
tion 32's limited reach with respect to rules, and in Peltz and Dixon he
specifically found that the rules at issue were rules "the violation of which
is made unlawful or the observance of which is required" by the Exchange
Act. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Judge Friendly was fa-
mously careful in reading the securities laws, and it is quite likely that his
decision to adopt a lax interpretation of "willfully" was informed by the
fact that the limiting language restricted criminal sanctions to a subset of
rules that Congress has identified as being of substantive importance in
other provisions of the Act. Certainly William Herlands, whose language
Judge Friendly borrowed to define "willfully," see Peltz, 433 F.2d at 54-55,
and whose analysis he found "penetrating," id. at 55, emphasized the criti-
cal importance of the limiting language in 1934. See Herlands, supra note
25, at 171-73.
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (SEC referral to the DOJ).
54 Id. § 78w(a); see infra Parts III and IV.
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or administrative proceeding, but also that he "use[d] or em-
ploy[ed] ... [a] manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance."55
The SEC is not likely to rename Rule 10b-5, but SEC rule
numbers do not have to refer to statutory section numbers.
None of the Securities Act rules do, and not all Exchange Act
rules addressing manipulative and deceptive devices do ei-
ther. For example, SEC Regulation M regulates trading
practices in securities offerings.56  Regulation of these trad-
ing practices is thought to be necessary because individuals
publicly offering securities may buy in the market to support
or stabilize the market price, and potential buyers may sell
in the market to drive down the public offering price. Until
recently, these practices have long been regulated under the
Exchange Act by rules identified with section 10(b); the pre-
decessor rules for Regulation M were Rules 10b-6, 10b-6A,
10b-7, 10b-8 and 10b-2 1.
The manner in which these rules are enforced shows that
the SEC can enforce rules governing manipulative or decep-
tive practices without reference to section 10(b) or any other
substantive provision of the Exchange Act. For instance, one
of the trading practice rules prohibits effecting short sales
immediately before a registered public offering and then
purchasing shares in the offering. This prohibition is the re-
al Rule 105 (Rule 105 of Regulation M),58 and Rule 10b-21
55 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52. The government might
also have to show that the SEC adopted the rule "in the public interest or
for the protection of investors," which is not an explicit requirement of sec-
tion 23(a).
56 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.101-05 (2013).
57 See Anti-manipulation Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, Se-
curities Act Release No. 7375, Exchange Act Release No. 38,067, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 22,412, 62 Fed. Reg. 520 (Jan. 3, 1997);
Trading Practices Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 7282, Exchange Act Release No. 37,094, Investment Company
Act Release No. 21,883, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,108 (April 18, 1996); Steve Thel,
$850,000 in Six Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 219, 290-91 (1994).
58 17 C.F.R. § 242.105.
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was its predecessor.5 9 The SEC can impose sanctions admin-
istratively or obtain an injunction and ancillary remedies for
a violation of the rule without charging a violation of section
10(b) or any other section of the statute.6 0
Courts presented with criminal prosecutions for viola-
tions of Exchange Act rules have not always been particular-
ly concerned with assuring that the rules in question were,
per section 32, rules "the violation of which is made unlawful
or the observance of which is required by the terms of' the
Exchange Act. Courts' inattention to section 32, however,
does not mean that the limitation does not exist. A preemi-
nent judge of securities law, Henry Friendly, was consistent-
ly careful to ensure that SEC rules were within section 32's
59 See Anti-manipulation Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, 62
Fed. Reg. at 538 ("The Commission is adopting Rule 105 to replace Rule
10b-21."). The SEC subsequently adopted a new Rule 10b-21 to address
naked short selling. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21; see "Naked" Short Selling An-
tifraud Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 58,774, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,666,
61,666 (Oct. 17, 2008).
60 See, e.g., SEC v. Colonial Inv. Mgmt. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 467, 470
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (issuing injunction and ancillary equitable remedies for
violation of Rule 105), aff'd, 381 F. App'x 27, 32 (2d Cir. 2010). No sub-
stantive provision of the Exchange Act is cited in either of the Colonial
opinions.
61 A few reported opinions have noted the restriction, but dealt with it
summarily. See United States v. McDermott, 131 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.
1942) (discussing section 32's limitation in connection with an unconstitu-
tional delegation argument); see also United States v. Schwartz, No. 66 CR
425, 1971 WL 260, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1971) (noting in criminal pros-
ecution for violation of Rule 8c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-1, that section 32
"punishes (1) any person who 'wilfully [sic) violates' any regulation the vio-
lation of which is made unlawful by the Act (as section 8(c) does here)");
United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12, 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (discussing
how section 32(a), which "imposes criminal sanctions upon persons who
make false statements of material facts . .. or who violate any Commission
rule or regulation," applies to proxy statements); cf. United States v. Gaga-
lis, No. 04-cr-126-01/06-PB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23517, at *9-18
(D.N.H. Mar. 20, 2006) (discussing the section 32 limitation). For further
discussion of Gagalis, see infra note 65.
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restrictive language in criminal cases.62 However, some very
important rules are not captured by that language.
Consider Rule 13b2-1, one of the most far-reaching rules
under the Exchange Act. It provides that "[n]o person shall
directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any
book, record or account subject to section 13(b)(2)(A) of the
Securities Exchange Act."6 3 The books, records, and accounts
to which it refers are those of publicly traded companies.
Thus, the rule forbids anyone to cause the records of a pub-
licly held company to be false. This is a huge field. For ex-
ample, any employee of a public company who submits a
fudged expense account violates the rule, as does a lawyer
who pads hours on a bill submitted to a public company.
Rule 13b2-1 is a valid rule, and perhaps a wise one.
Nothing in this Article suggests that the SEC should not en-
force it. However, Rule 13b2-1 is frequently enforced crimi-
nally,64 even though the Exchange Act neither makes a viola-
62 In United States v. Peltz, Judge Friendly correctly held that Rule
10b-5 is a rule covered by section 32. See 433 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1970)
("Section 32(a) ... makes criminal any willful violation of any provision of
the act or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made
unlawful. Section 10(b) of the Act and the Commission's Rule 10b-5
thereunder . . . qualify under this test."). See also United States v. Dixon,
536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.) (holding that failure to
include required information in form 10-K report and proxy statement
"were clear violations of 'any provision of this chapter, or any rule or regu-
lation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the ob-
servance of which is required under the terms of this chapter,' the lan-
guage of the first clause of § 32(a)" (citation omitted)). Judge Friendly is
preeminent in the field of securities regulation. See Louis Loss, In Memo-
riam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1722, 1723 (1986) ("Judge
Friendly, without a doubt, did more to shape the law of securities regula-
tion than any judge in the country."); see also Margaret V. Sachs, Judge
Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial
Reputation, 50 SMVIU L. REV. 777, 780 (1997) ("Judge Friendly achieved re-
nown in . . . securities regulation . . . ."); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889-90 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing
the Second Circuit as the "mother court" of securities law and Judge
Friendly as its "master arborist").
63 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012).
64 See United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2010); United
States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
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tion of this rule unlawful, nor requires observance of the
rule."5 Rule 13b2-1 is just the sort of rule that Congress was
loath to have criminally enforced.66 The difficulty of regulat-
ing a complicated and evolving field led Congress to empower
the SEC to adopt whatever rules it finds necessary or proper
and to allow the agency to require compliance with those
rules. Nonetheless, ensuring effective regulation does not
require that Congress give the Commission equally broad
discretion to decide what conduct should be subject to crimi-
Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 516-17 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Stuart H. Deming,
The Changing Face of White-Collar Crime: The Potent and Broad-Ranging
Implications of the Accounting and Record-keeping Provisions of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 484-89
(2006).
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (requiring public corporations to keep
good books and records and maintain sufficient internal accounting con-
trols, but not discussing rules). Similarly, section 13(b)(5) does not discuss
rules, either ("No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to
implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify
any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2)."). Id. § 78m(b)(5).
Gagalis involved a criminal conviction for the violation of a related rule,
Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2, which suffered from the same infir-
mity for purposes of criminal prosecution. No. 04-cr-126-01/06-PB, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23517, at *4. The defendants argued that the rule ex-
ceeded the SEC's statutory rulemaking authority, but the court found that
section 23 authorized it. Id. at *15. The defendants also argued that the
rule could not serve as a basis for criminal prosecution because the Ex-
change Act does not make violation of the rule unlawful or require compli-
ance with it. Id. at *16. The court rejected that argument, stating that it
misses the point. Section [32] criminally punishes the vio-
lation of rules that must be observed under the Exchange
Act... . Rule 13b2-2 was a valid exercise of the SEC's au-
thority to promulgate regulations and thus it has the force
and effect of law. Therefore, I conclude that a willful viola-
tion of Rule 13b2-2 may result in criminal liability under §
[32(a)].
Id. at *17 (citation omitted). This analysis misses the point. It would sub-
ject any validly adopted SEC rule to criminal sanction and thus disregard
the limitation in section 32.
66 See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 156 (1982).
No. I:1]) 21
nal sanctions, and Congress did not grant such discretion in
the Exchange Act.
III. THE SEC'S RULEMAKING POWER
The Exchange Act gives the SEC almost unfettered rule-
making power. Section 23(a) declares that the Commission
shall "have power to make such rules and regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of
this [Act] . . . or for the execution of the functions vested in
them."6 The extraordinary breadth of the grant of adminis-
trative power was not controversial because, as discussed
above, the securities exchanges and others who were to be
regulated by the Exchange Act had proposed it.68  Section
23(a) has always been understood to confer lawmaking au-
thority on the SEC,6 9 and since 1934, the Commission has
67 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1); see also Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv.,
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) ("Where the empowering provision of a stat-
ute states simply that the agency may 'make .. . such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,' we have
held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sus-
tained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation."') (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81
(1969)). The Commission's rulemaking power under the Exchange Act is
broader than its power under the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)
("The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend,
and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this subchapter . . . ."). See also SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien,
Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 744 (1984) (incorrectly indicating that both statutes al-
low "necessary or proper" rules).
68 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Those who re-
mained opposed to administrative rulemaking power focused on section 23
and its predecessor provisions in earlier versions of the Act. See Stock Ex-
change Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong. 159, 227, 262, 667, 669-
70 (1934); Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 6938, 6993-94, 7021, 7285.
69 The Supreme Court has cited rules adopted under section 23(a) as
an example of rules carrying the force of law. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010) (citing section 23 to show that
the SEC's powers are generally vested in the Commissioners jointly, not in
the Chair alone); SEC Task Force Report, supra note 26, at 1141 ("The
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consistently relied upon section 23(a) to adopt a notoriously
wide range of rules.70
Congress has continued to regard section 23(a) as the
source of the SEC's rulemaking power. Since 1934, whenev-
er Congress has made general changes in the SEC's rule-
making power, it has done so by amending section 23. For
SEC's general rulemaking power derives from section 23(a)(1) of the Ex-
change Act."); Merrill & Watts, supra note 21, at 510 (Section 23 has "al-
ways been regarded as conferring legislative rulemaking authority.").
Merrill and Watts add:
Section 23(a) [of the Exchange Act] provided that "the
Commission and the Federal Reserve Board shall each
have power to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the execution of the functions vested in them
by this title." According to the convention, Congress indi-
cated its intent to give legislative effect to these rules and
regulations through two statutory provisions. First,
[S]ection 21(e) [now § 21(d)] gave the SEC the power to
bring an action seeking to enjoin the violation of any rule
or regulation promulgated under the Act. Second, [S]ection
32 set forth penalties for violations of any rules or regula-
tions promulgated by the SEC.
Id. at 510 n.215 (citations omitted). Merrill and Watts overstate the effect
of section 32 when they say that it set forth criminal penalties for violation
of "any" SEC rule. However, the availability of injunctive relief for the vio-
lation of any rule satisfies their test for rules with the force of law. See id.
at 472 (noting that "some sanction" would meet the test).
70 The SEC adopted many rules, including Rule 10b-5, before the en-
actment of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which requires
agencies to reference the legal authority under which a rule is proposed. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (2012). Shortly after the APA was enacted, the Com-
mission published all of its Exchange Act rules (including Rule 10b-5) in
the Federal Register. At the end of the list of rules, under the caption "Au-
thority," the Commission stated that all these rules were "issued under
sec. 23." 13 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8178 (Dec. 22, 1948).
71 See, e.g., Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Re-
form Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429 § 204, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (adding
section 23(d) to provide for regulations for cease-and-desist proceedings).
But see National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290 § 106, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f), requiring
the SEC to consider efficiency and capital formation in rulemaking). As
discussed below, Congress has amended other sections of the Act to direct
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example, in 1975, as part of a major revision of the securities
laws, it amended section 23 to require the SEC to consider
the potential burden on competition posed by new rules, and
also replaced the Commission's original power to make "nec-
essary" ruleS72 with its current power to make "necessary or
appropriate" rules.7 3 As a result, Congress conferred its own
broad "necessary and proper" power7 1 on the SEC, but made
it disjunctive. It is hard to imagine language conveying a
broader grant of rulemaking authority.
Besides granting the SEC rulemaking power in section
2 3(a), the Exchange Act repeatedly refers to Commission
rules. Most of these references take one of two forms. Some
provisions, like section 10(b), state that "it shall be unlawful"
to do certain activities "in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe."7 Other pro-
visions state that certain people must do certain things "in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may [or shall] prescribe."7 ' For example, section 13(a)
requires most publicly held companies to file periodic reports
"in accordance with" SEC rules.
the SEC to adopt rules governing conduct in certain areas, such as tender
offers. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
72 See Exchange Act § 23, 89 Stat. 881, 901 (1934).
73 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 18,
89 Stat. 97, 156 (1975); see also S. REP. No. 94-75, at 145, 242 (1975) (Sec-
tion 23(a)(1) marked to show changes from previous law). The committees
responsible for the 1975 amendments recognized that the SEC's primary
rulemaking power lies in section 23(a). See, e.g., id. at 192 ("[I]n promul-
gating its own rules under section 23(a) . . . the Commission would be re-
quired to make specific findings as the justification for any limitation on,
or restraint of, competition . . . ."); id. at 312 (amending "section 23 of the
Exchange Act concerning rulemaking powers").
74 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
75 15 U.S.C. § 78j. See also id. §§ 78i(a)(6), 78i(b), 78j(a)(1), 78m(e)(1),
78n(a)(1), 78n(b)(1), 78dd; cf. id. §§ 78h(a), 781(a), 78o(c)(3)(A) (similar lan-
guage); see id. § 78g (Federal Reserve Board rules).
76 See id. §§ 78m(a), 78m(d)(2), 78m(g)(2), 78n(c), 78n(d)(4), 78o(d); cf.
id. § 78g(c)(1)(B) (Federal Reserve Board rules).
77 See id. § 78m(a).
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These provisions identify subjects that Congress expected
the SEC to regulate, and could be read to grant the SEC
rulemaking authority beyond what is found in section 23(a).
However, section 23(a) confers ample rulemaking power, and
construing other provisions to confer additional power does
not add to the Commission's power or the Exchange Act's co-
herence. Moreover, unlike section 23(a), these provisions do
not explicitly delegate rulemaking power to the SEC. They
do, however, make the violation of certain rules a crime. The
two mechanisms they employ-making the violation of rules
unlawful and requiring observance of rules-are precisely
the two mechanisms section 32 uses to identify rules whose
violation is subject to criminal sanction.
Another set of provisions that refer to rules, manipula-
tion, and deception-key terms of section 10(b)-reinforce
the conclusion that section 10(b) is primarily a sanctioning
provision. Several provisions of the Exchange Act actually
prohibit the use of manipulative and deceptive acts and prac-
tices in certain circumstances. 8  These provisions, unlike
section 10(b), forbid manipulation or deception, even if no
SEC rule is violated. They also direct the Commission to
adopt what could be called implementing rules. 9 For exam-
ple, section 14(e) makes it unlawful to engage in deceptive or
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (tender offers); § 78o(c) (brokers and dealers);
§ 78i(d) (short sales).
79 See id. § 78n(e); § 78o(c)(2)(D) (brokers and dealers) ("The Commis-
sion shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, by rules and regulations de-
fine, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative . . . ."); § 78i(d)
("The Commission shall issue such other rules as are necessary or appro-
priate to ensure that the appropriate enforcement options and remedies
are available for violations of this subsection in the public interest or for
the protection of investors."); cf. id. § 78m(e)(1) ("It shall be unlawful for
an issuer which has a class of equity securities registered pursuant to sec-
tion 12 of this title . . . to purchase any equity security issued by it if such
purchase is in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion, in the public interest or for the protection of investors, may adopt (A)
to define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive, and (B) to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts
and practices.").
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manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender
offer. It further provides that the SEC "shall, for purposes of
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."8 0
The fact that these sections of the Exchange Act direct, ra-
ther than authorize, the Commission to adopt rules suggests
that the underlying power to promulgate rules lies elsewhere
(i.e., in section 23(a)). If section 14(e) and other similar pro-
visions do delegate rulemaking power, they suggest that
when Congress wants to grant special rulemaking power to
the Commission, it expressly states that it is doing so, rather
than simply using rules as a trigger, as it did in section
10(b).81
IV. THE ADOPTION OF RULE 1OB-5
Section 23(a) gave the SEC ample power to adopt rule
10b-5. The first reported opinion to cite the rule said that it
"was promulgated under section 23(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934."82 Remarkably, however, the Supreme
Court has never cited section 23 in its Rule 10b-5 cases. In-
stead, it has repeatedly stated, albeit without citing any au-
thority other than itself, that the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5
pursuant to section 10(b) rulemaking power.8 3
80 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
81 See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 n.11
(1985) (discussing rule clause of section 14(e)); see also United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 667 (1997) (Section 14(e) "delegates definitional
and prophylactic rulemaking authority to the Commission.").
82 Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 326 (3d Cir.
1944).
83 See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 U.S.
2296, 2301 (2011) ("The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to authori-
ty granted under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .");
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) ("Rule
10b-5 .. . was promulgated under § 10(b)"); id. at 2876; The Wharf (Hold-
ings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 592-93 (2001) ("Pur-
suant to [section 10(b)], the SEC has promulgated Rule 10b-5."); O'Hagan,
521 U.S. at 651 ("Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Com-
mission has adopted Rule 10b-5 . . . ."); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
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Rule 10b-5's genesis lies in a quirk of the federal securi-
ties statutes. While every security trade has a buyer and a
seller, it seems that sellers are more likely to engage in fraud
and, accordingly, federal securities regulation generally fo-
cuses on sellers' conduct.84 Thus, until 1942, federal securi-
ties law did not generally prohibit securities buyers from en-
gaging in fraudulent conduct. That year, the SEC adopted
Rule 10b-5 to prohibit fraud by purchasers of securities. The
rule extends the prohibition of deceptive sell-side practices
contained in section 17(a) of the Securities Act to buyers of
securities.8 5  One of the many ironies of Rule 10b-5 is that
224, 230 (1988) ("Pursuant to its authority under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act . .
. the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5.");
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("In 1942, acting
pursuant to the power conferred by § 10(b), the Commission promulgated
Rule 10b-5 . . . ."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
729 (1975) ("In 1942, acting under the authority granted to it by § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5 . . . ."); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007)
("SEC Rule 10b-5 implements § 10(b) .... ).
84 In some sense, the whole point of the Securities Act of 1933 is to
require complete candor of those who sell securities to the public. See
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 ("The Securities Act of 1933 ... was designed
to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning
public offerings of securities . . . .").
85 See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). While it is well-known that Rule
10b-5 was based on the language of section 17(a) of the Securities Act, see
infra note 87, a word-by-word comparison shows how little the rule
changed preexisting law, and how little it was intended to add to the law.
In the following version of Rule 10b-5, language omitted from section 17(a)
is shown struck through, and language added is shown in italics. Changes
in capitalization are ignored. The subparts are numbered in the statute,
while they are lettered in the rule.
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer- r eale-of
any-seeurities directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instruments-instrumentality of tranepertation-er
eemmuRicatien i interstate commerce, or by-use of the
mails,-direetly or indireetly-of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,-er
(b) To obtan money or preperty by moanof make any un-
true statement of a material fact or any emission to omit to
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the courts have created a private action for its violation, but
not for a violation of the statutory provision on which it was
modeled. The Comnission's sole purpose in promulgating
the rule was to reach fraud by buyers," and no one involved
expected much from it.8 7
state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading-, or
(c) To engage in any tranesties act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or de-
ceit upon the purehase any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
86 The original title of the rule was "Employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices by any purchaser of a security." See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (May 21, 1942); ("The Securities and Ex-
change Commission today announced the adoption of a rule prohibiting
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities. The
previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities ap-
plied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the
protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting
individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in
their purchase."); SEC, EIGHTH ANN. REP. OF THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N
10 (1943) ("During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5 as
an additional protection to investors. The new rule prohibits fraud by any
person in connection with the purchase of securities, while the previously
existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to
brokers and dealers."); Correction, 16 Fed. Reg. 7928-01 (Aug. 11, 1951)
("In the reprint of the rules and regulations under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, certified on December 15, 1948, and printed at 13 F. R. 8177
et seq., the headnote of § 240.10b-5 should be corrected to read 'Employ-
ment of manipulative and deceptive devices."' (emphasis supplied)); cf. Ca-
dy, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 n.22 (1961) ("We note that, in 16 F.R.
7928, August 11, 1951, the Commission struck the words 'by a purchaser'
from the title of Rule 10b-5 (then X10B-5) so as to read "Employment of
manipulative and deceptive devices."); id. at 910 ("Although the primary
function of Rule 10b-5 was to extend a remedy to a defrauded seller, the
courts and this Commission have held that it is also applicable to a de-
frauded buyer.").
87 For first-person accounts of the rule's adoption, see 8 Loss, SELIG-
MAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 500; Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium:
Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. S1 (1993); ABA Sect. of Corp., Banking &
Bus. Law, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967); Letter from Mayer U. Newfield to Milton V.
Freeman, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 8, 1996), available at
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It was natural for the SEC to turn to section 10(b) to jus-
tify the extension of section 17(a) to buyers. While most pro-
visions of the securities laws focus on offers and sales, sec-
tion 10(b) reaches misconduct "in connection with the pur-
purchase or sale" of a security."8 But section 10(b) was not
seen as a particularly important provision of the Exchange
Act at the time-indeed it seems never even to have been
cited by a court 89-and the SEC did not rest on section 10(b)
alone. When it announced that it was adopting the rule, the
SEC said that it was doing so "pursuant to authority con-
ferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, par-
ticularly sections 10(b) and 23(a)." Moreover, it parroted the
language of section 23(a), when it deemed adoption of the
rule "necessary for the exercise of the functions vested in
it." 90
V. DISENTANGLING RULE 1OB-5 FROM SECTION
10(B)
The Supreme Court has caused a number of avoidable
problems by treating Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) as coex-
tensive. Consider, for example, the regulation of insider
trading under Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court created the
law, and, as it typically does in Rule 10b-5 cases, paid very
little attention to the rule in its insider trading cases.91 The
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1990/1996_0208_NewfieldR
ulelOb5.pdf [hereinafter Newfield Letter]. See also Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 766-67 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Conference on
Codification, supra, at 922).
88 See Newfield Letter, supra note 87.
89 The first reported opinion citing section 10(b) was decided in 1944.
See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
90 Exchange Act Release No. 3230, supra note 86. Later, in a compila-
tion of all of its Exchange Act rules (including Rule 10b-5) in the Federal
Register, the SEC stated that it adopted all those rules under authority of
section 23. 13 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8178 (Dec. 22, 1948).
91 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-54 (1997); Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
236-37 (1980).
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law of insider trading is judicially-created and cannot be
learned by reading section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. 92
Notwithstanding pressure to clarify the law, Congress
has been reluctant to amend the Exchange Act to state clear-
ly when insider trading is illegal, for fear that a statutory
definition would amount to a roadmap for fraud, charting
ways for informed traders to circumvent prosecution. 93 Of
course, this problem is precisely what motivated Congress to
give the SEC rulemaking power rather than prohibiting spe-
cific conduct by statute. If an SEC rule defining and prohib-
iting insider trading turned out to permit some troubling
practices, the SEC could change its rule much more expedi-
tiously than Congress could amend a statute. However, by
ignoring the language of Rule 10b-5 and assuming that any
conduct within the scope of section 10(b) is prohibited, the
Supreme Court has destroyed any incentive for the SEC to
adopt a clear rule. Thus, insider trading is regulated by a
rule modeled on the broad and ambiguous language of an-
other statute not tailored to insider trading cases. The rule
gives no notice to those trading while in possession of non-
public information of what is required to trade legally.9 4
92 See Interview by James Stocker with Paul Gonson, SEC Solicitor,
SEC Historical Society Oral History Project, 28-29 (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/oral-histories/e-g/ ("Even today,...
there still is no definition of insider trading in the law or in any SEC rule,
but many, many cases on the subject. So really, if you want to know insid-
er trading law you have to go to case books and read those decisions.").
93 See H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988) ("While cognizant of the im-
portance of providing clear guidelines for behavior which may be subject to
stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee nevertheless declined to
include a statutory definition in this bill. . . . [A] statutory definition could
potentially be narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes
to evade the law.").
94 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("While
the Court's explanation of the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be en-
tirely reasonable in some other context, it does not seem to accord with the
principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes (which cannot be mitigat-
ed here by the Rule, which is no less ambiguous than the statute)."); cf.
Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV.
857, 861 (1984) ("Had Congress wanted to promulgate a prohibition of
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The Supreme Court's excessive focus on section 10(b) in
deciding Rule 10b-5 cases has impeded the administration of
the securities laws, wasted congressional resources, and un-
dermined the public interest. The Court is responsible for
this situation and it is uniquely situated to correct it. The
solution lies in recognizing distinctions between private and
public enforcement of Rule 10b-5.
With respect to private enforcement, the Supreme Court
should openly embrace its unavoidable primacy as lawmak-
er. Someone must make the law governing private litigation
under Rule 10b-5. The statute says relatively little on the
subject and, while Congress occasionally amends the Ex-
change Act to govern private actions under the rule," ulti-
mately courts must set most of the rules for private litigation
under Rule 10b-5. The Court has acknowledged as much,
and has candidly looked beyond the language of section 10(b)
in refining the elements of the private cause of action for vio-
lations of the rule, as opposed to determining the conduct
prohibited by the rule, which section 10(b) controls.16  Not-
withstanding the Court's poor record of reading the Ex-
change Act, it should go further and reconsider the wisdom
of some of the private litigation it has created itself.
With respect to public enforcement, the Court should be
more cautious. The statute addresses public enforcement in
great detail. The fact that courts need to develop law for pri-
vate litigation under Rule 10b-5 does not require or justify
applying that law to actions brought by the SEC. On the
contrary, fidelity to the Exchange Act requires that the
Court explicitly limit its decisions in private actions to en-
such generality [as Rule 10b-5], it could have done so and eliminate [sic]
the intermediate requirement of a Commission regulation.").
95 The primary example is the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (codified in Securities Act §§
11, 12, 20, 27, 27A; Exchange Act §§ 10A, 15, 20, 21, 21D, 21E.
96 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 n.5
(2010); id. at 2888-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Cent. Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1994);
see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
("When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, ... we consider ...
what may be described as policy considerations. . . .").
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sure that the law governing private actions is not applied to
cases initiated by the SEC.
This Part shows how a more careful regard for the statute
and the rule can help rationalize the enforcement and ad-
ministration of the securities laws. The reflexive use of sec-
tion 10(b) to determine the contours of private actions under
Rule 10b-5 has created the fraud on the market class action
and its attendant problems, and the Supreme Court should
revisit those actions. Congress has repeatedly rejected ex-
tension of the Court's restrictive section 10(b) cases to the
SEC, implicitly rejecting the Court's approach to the statute
as well. In the context of longstanding and noncontroversial
SEC regulation of trading practices, the Court's interpreta-
tion of section 10(b) is not consistent with the language,
structure, or history of the Exchange Act.
A. Section 10(b) and Private Actions: Fraud on the
Market
The most costly and consequential private cases under
Rule 10b-5 are so-called fraud on the market class actions.
In these cases, securities traders seek to recover their trad-
ing losses from corporate security issuers that made false
statements that affected market prices, even though the cor-
porate defendants did not themselves buy or sell the securi-
ties." These cases constitute the great bulk of shareholder
claims litigated in federal courts. Public companies have
"roughly a two percent chance of being sued in a securities
class action in any given year."9" These cases are extraordi-
narily disruptive and expensive to litigate, and commenta-
97 See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Re-
structuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of
Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1312 (2008) ("[Tjhe prototypical Rule
10b-5 case [has become] a class action brought on behalf of thousands of
investors, based on misstatements or omissions made in public disclosure
documents that most class members never read, against a deep-pocketed
corporate defendant that did not itself profit from the fraud.").
98 ToM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
How LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 22
(2010).
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tors have grown increasingly critical of their cost and failure
to advance the interests of investors or the public at large.9 9
Fraud on the market actions rest on a very thin statutory
reed (or read).100 Until 1968, it seemed clear that Rule 10b-5
did not reach a non-trading corporation that made false
statements about its operations. Then, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.101 the Second Circuit said it did. That result,
the court explained, followed from the language of section
10(b). Section 10(b) reaches conduct "in connection with" a
security trade, while other antifraud provisions reach only
those who "offer or sell a security by means of' false state-
ments, 10 2 or employ false statements "in the offer or sale of
any securities."1 03 These distinctions, the court concluded,
"demonstrate that when Congress intended that there be a
participation in a securities transaction as a prerequisite of a
violation, it knew how to make that intention clear."104
Texas Gulf Sulphur was an extremely important and con-
troversial case, but its implications for non-trading issuers
were limited. It permitted the SEC to pursue them, but the
monetary sanctions from government litigation were almost
never ruinous. It did not substantially increase the risk of
private litigation, since private claimants still had to show
that they had relied upon and been damaged by issuer false
99 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 72 (2011) ("The
fraud-on-the-market .. . cause of action just doesn't work. At least that is
the consensus view among academics respecting the primary class action
vehicle under the federal securities laws."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming
the Securities Class Action, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); Donald C.
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 Ws.
L. REV. 151 (2009); Rose, supra note 97; Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1303-04 (1982).
100 See Merritt Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 246 n.16 (2009); Merritt Fox, Securities Class Actions
Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1186-90 (2012).
101 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
102 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012).
103 See id. § 77q(a).
104 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 860.
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statements. This requirement made it an expensive strategy
to pursue in private litigation and made class actions im-
practicable. In 1988, however, the Supreme Court's decision
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson changed the implications for non-
trading issuers. That decision allowed plaintiffs in some cir-
cumstances to satisfy the reliance requirement in private ac-
tions by establishing that the issuer's false statements af-
fected the market price of its securities.10 5 By permitting a
presumption of reliance to substitute for individualized in-
vestor proof, Basic made class actions practicable. Since
then, "[t]ens of billions of dollars have changed hands in set-
tlements of 10b-5 lawsuits ... as a result of Basic."1 06
The Supreme Court certainly knew that it was effectively
enabling private class actions in Basic, but, remarkably, the
majority did not even mention that its decision would impose
substantial liability on public companies that were not them-
selves trading.' Texas Gulf Sulphur may have been rightly
decided, but, as Judge Friendly emphasized in his concur-
rence, the decision to permit the SEC to pursue a non-
105 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). As the Court not-
ed, some lower courts had already accepted the fraud on the market theo-
ry. See id. at 229-30.
106 Langevoort, supra note 99, at 152.
107 The closest the majority came to even recognizing that it was al-
lowing actions against non-trading defendants was in a footnote in anoth-
er part of its opinion dealing with the definition of materiality: "We find no
authority in the statute, the legislative history, or our previous decisions
for varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings the action
or whether insiders are alleged to have profited." 485 U.S. at 240 n.18. The
dissenters in Basic, in contrast, were concerned with the likely conse-
quences of the decision. See id. at 250-51 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
fraud-on-the-market theory is a mere babe. Yet today, the Court embraces
this theory with the sweeping confidence usually reserved for more mature
legal doctrines. In so doing, I fear that the Court's decision may have
many adverse, unintended effects as it is applied and interpreted in the
years to come."). The Court has expressed similar sentiments in decisions
restricting the private right of action for violations of Rule 10b-5. See
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
189 (1994); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739, 747-48
(1975).
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trading company did not lead, ineluctably, to the conclusion
that securities traders should be permitted to shift their
losses to the non-trading issuer of those securities, and, indi-
rectly, to its non-trading shareholders (none of whom profit-
ed from the misrepresentation).1 0 8 Given the implications of
fraud on the market class actions and the substantial criti-
cism they have engendered, their value should be reex-
amined by someone with power to regulate them. Congress
could do so, but it is difficult to enact legislation, and the
failure of Congress to reverse Basic hardly shows that Con-
gress would have created private class actions against non-
trading issuers itself.09 On the contrary, it is hard to imag-
ine that any American Congress would ever have created
such actions,1 o and it is certain that no Congress would do it
knowing what fraud on the market actions have wrought.
Fraud on the market class actions are entirely the creation of
the Supreme Court. The problems they engender might
have been avoided if the Court had asked in Basic whether
the scope of Rule 10b-5-or section 10(b)-is the same in pri-
10s See 401 F.2d at 866 ("[W]e should explicate more clearly why, de-
spite the principle that a violation of the securities laws or regulations
generally gives rise to a private claim for damages, violation of Rule 10b-
5(2) may not do so under all circumstances . . . ." (citation omitted)); see
also id. at 867 ("If the only choices open to a corporation are either to re-
main silent and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communica-
tion, not legally required, at the risk that a slip of the pen or failure
properly to amass or weigh the fact-all judged in the bright gleam of hind-
sight-will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent
investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers, most corpora-
tions would opt for the former.").
109 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 99, at 133-47 (discussing im-
pediments to legislative reform of fraud on the market); see also William
N. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 67
(1988) (addressing "longstanding debate in the theory of statutory inter-
pretation over what meaning, if any, can be attributed to the legislature's
failure to do something.").
110 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2012) provides a private right of action against
issuers that make false or misleading statements in SEC filings. Howev-
er, because it has a limited scope and imposes substantial limitations and
conditions, only a few cases have been brought under it. See 9 Loss,
SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 363-68.
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vate and SEC actions. Inasmuch as it didn't, it should re-
solve the Basic problem now. Although the Court may be re-
luctant to undertake the overtly political task of limiting pri-
vate rights of action on the basis of its own policy prefer-
preferences,"' both the private right of action and the Basic
fraud on the market class action are judicial creations.
It would no doubt be difficult for any court to determine
the social value of fraud on the market litigation within the
confines of the judicial process in a particular case, and the
question involves political considerations and financial ques-
tions that may exceed judicial competence. This might sug-
gest that the SEC should address the Basic question through
rulemaking, inasmuch as it may have greater technical com-
petence and political legitimacy than the courts in this con-
text. Academic commentators have also argued that the
SEC should play a greater role in policing the contours of the
private right of action under Rule 10b-5.1 12 The Court, how-
ever, has been remarkably hostile to the SEC's opinions on
section 10(b) generally, and on the private right of action
particularly, and has shown the Commission little, if any,
deference. 1 13
111 See Girardeau A. Spann, Teaching Constitutional Law, 49 ST. Lou-
is U.L.J. 709, 715 (2005).
112 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 99, at 147-67 (proposing that
the SEC remove, by rule, the presumption of reliance); Joseph A. Grund-
fest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994) (propos-
ing that the SEC consider disimplying the private right of action under
Rule 10b-5); Rose, supra note 97 (proposing that the SEC be empowered to
determine when Rule 10b-5 class actions may be filed).
113 As the Court recently summarized in Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v.
First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2303 n.8 (2011) (parallel cita-
tions omitted):
[W]e have previously expressed skepticism over the degree
to which the SEC should receive deference regarding the
private right of action. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41, n.27 (1977) (noting that the SEC's pre-
sumed expertise "is of limited value" when analyzing
"whether a cause of action should be implied by judicial in-
terpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants").
This also is not the first time this Court has disagreed with
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The Court's position seems jarring in the age of Chev-
ron,,1 14 but it is largely consistent with the scheme of the Ex-
change Act. The Exchange Act does give the SEC authority
to make rules carrying the force of law, and Rule 10b-5 is
such a rule.11 5 However, the SEC has a minimal role with
respect to section 10(b). Moreover, the Exchange Act pro-
vides clear and unambiguous remedies for violations of the
Act and the SEC's rules, and nothing in the Exchange Act
suggests that Congress authorized the SEC to change those
remedies1 16 or create a private right of action for violation of
its rules. However much authority the SEC has to imple-
ment the Exchange Act, the Act does not authorize the SEC
to tinker with the judicially created private right of action.1 17
the SEC's broad view of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 188-191(1994); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 666, n.27 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeld-
er, 425 U.S. 185, 207 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746, n.10 (1975).
114 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
115 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
116 Cf. Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S.Ct. 1216 (2013) (holding that the limita-
tion period of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2006) applies to SEC civil penalty actions,
without discussing deference). Judicial hostility to the SEC's attempts to
determine the parameters of private actions established by the securities
statutes is evident in recent decisions rejecting Securities Act Rule 159A,
17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2013), which defines the word "seller" in section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012), a statutory pri-
vate remedy, to include issuers in firm commitment underwritings. See
Maine State Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 2:10-CV-0302 MRP
(MANx), 2011 WL 4389689, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2011) ("The Court
therefore concludes that, regardless of what the SEC's position may be,
Plaintiffs must allege direct solicitation."); see also Capital Ventures Int'l
v. UBS Sec. LLC, No. 11-11937-DJC, 2012 WL 4469101, at *14 n.9 (D.
Mass. Sept. 28, 2012); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Residential Funding Co.,
LLC, 843 F.Supp. 2d 191, 207 (D. Mass. 2012). The courts might have
simply noted that Rule 159A is a nullity, inasmuch as the word "seller,"
which the SEC defined in the rule, does not appear in section 12.
117 Cf. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("[E]ven if
[the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act's] language
establishing a private right of action is ambiguous, we need not defer to
the Secretary of Labor's view of the scope of [29 U.S.C.] § 1854 because
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B. Section 10(b) and SEC Power
Just as Texas Gulf Sulphur's expansive reading of section
10(b) in SEC actions led to problems when it was extended to
private actions in Basic, extending a narrow construction
adopted in private actions to SEC actions can complicate the
administration of the Exchange Act and undermine the pub-
lic interest. When the Supreme Court construes section
10(b) to constrain private litigation under Rule 10b-5, it al-
most inevitably must also constrain the SEC's enforcement
actions." 8 Thus, four years after deciding Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,"9 the Court said that the SEC also had to prove
Congress has expressly established the Judiciary and not the Department
of Labor as the adjudicator of private rights of action arising under the
statute. A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional del-
egation of administrative authority.").
Professor and former SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest has force-
fully argued that the SEC has the authority to "disimply" the private right
of action under Rule 10b-5. See Grundfest, supra note 112, at 976. His
argument rests on the incorrect reading of section 10(b) as a delegation of
rulemaking authority. See id. at 977 ("The logic in support of disimplica-
tion is simple. Section 10(b) is, by its terms, nothing more than a congres-
sional delegation of authority to the Commission to adopt antifraud 'rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."'). Professors
Bratton & Wachter also suggest that the SEC has the power to limit pri-
vate actions under Rule 10b-5, although they acknowledge it may not. See
supra note 99, at 165. Their argument follows Grundfest's (although they
characterize his article as only "failing to see any legal obstacle to the
Commission's ability to disimply private rights of action," id. at 165 n.367),
and is premised on the same misreading of section 10(b). See id. at 165
("In our view, the SEC has the power to remove the FOTM presumption
via rulemaking. The authority follows from the words of section 10(b),
which delegates authority to make such antifraud 'rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe . . . .').
118 The Court's private-action decisions are frequently discussed by
student notes addressing the division of lower courts on the question of
whether those decisions govern government enforcement actions. See Da-
vid He, Note, Beyond Securities Fraud: the Territorial Reach of U.S. Laws
After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 148; Matthew P.
Wynne, Note, Rule 10b-5(b) Enforcement Actions in Light of Janus: Mak-
ing the Case for Agency Deference, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111 (2013).
119 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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scienter in its Rule 10b-5 cases, explaining that "the ra-
tionale of Hochfelder ineluctably leads to the conclusion that
scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of
the relief sought."12 0
Supreme Court decisions that require scienter for Rule
10b-5 actions may have been good ones. The "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance" language of section 10(b)
can be read to restrict the section to misconduct, and that
reading is almost certainly correct in the context of a crimi-
nal case.12 1 The question of intent in private actions is one
for the courts, and the holding in Hochfelder can be justified
on policy grounds. The Court's extension of the requirement
to the SEC cannot be justified by the reading of the statute
offered here, but some heightened intent may be required in
order for the SEC to secure an injunction against further vio-
lations anyway.122 In any event, the SEC can reach most of
the conduct covered by Rule 10b-5 under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act without proving scienter.
The history of Hochfelder notwithstanding, Congress has
repeatedly rejected the extension of the Court's restrictive
section 10(b) cases to the SEC. Congress is apparently quite
comfortable with allowing the SEC to forbid and sanction
conduct that private parties cannot challenge. From the leg-
islative perspective, it is usually a bad idea to use section
10(b) to limit the power of the SEC.
For example, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver,'2 3 the Court held that a private action under
Rule 10b-5 is not available against those who aid and abet
the violation. The Court's emphasis on the language of sec-
tion 10(b) suggested that the SEC would not be able to en-
120 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
121 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a).
122 See SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1040 (2d Cir. 1990) (to
obtain an injunction against further violations, SEC must "make a sub-
stantial showing of likelihood of success as to both a current violation and
the risk of repetition.").
123 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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force the rule against aiders and abettors either.12 4 Congress
promptly responded by adding section 20(e) to the Exchange
Act, which now provides that in an SEC action for an injunc-
tion, "any person that knowingly or recklessly provides sub-
stantial assistance to another person in violation of a provi-
sion of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under
this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provi-
sion to the same extent as the person to whom such assis-
tance is provided."125
Similarly, soon after the Supreme Court limited the ex-
traterritorial reach of section 10(b) in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., 1 2 6 Congress amended section 27 of the
Exchange Act 1 2 7 to provide that the courts have jurisdiction
in actions brought by the SEC or the United States involving
conduct outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States. 128
Congress has rejected' some of the Court's other section
10(b) cases more subtly. Notwithstanding considerable pres-
sure to do so, it did not overturn the Court's retrograde in-
124 See 511 U.S. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The majority leaves
little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue
aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule
lob-5.").
125 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e); see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104 (adding section 20(e)); see also Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
9290 (2010) (amending section 20(e) to reach reckless behavior); cf. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-2(a) (providing administrative penalties for willfully aiding or
abetting violation).
126 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
127 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; see Dodd-Frank Act § 9290 (amending section
27). This amendment was as clumsy as many of the Supreme Court's Rule
10b-5 cases. See Adam Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court:
Agenda or Indifference, 37 J. Corp. L. 105, 134-35 (2011). It provides that
courts will have jurisdiction of government-initiated cases, even though in
Morrison Justice Scalia emphasized that the decision was on the reach of
section 10(b), not on the jurisdiction of courts. See 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
128 See SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (KBF), 2013 WL 2407172, at
*1 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013) ("[Tjhe Dodd-Frank Act effectively re-
versed Morrison in the context of SEC enforcement actions.").
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sider trading decision in Dirks v. SEC.' Instead, Congress
sought to limit the decision's implications and reinforce the
nascent misappropriation theory in an unusual way-
through statutory findings stating that the SEC's rules gov-
erning trading while in possession of material, non-public in-
formation were, as required by the Exchange Act, necessary
and appropriate, and that the SEC had enforced them effec-
tively and fairly.130
The Court created a less tractable problem with its inter-
pretation of the term "manipulative" in section 10(b). An-
other irony of the ascendancy of Rule 10b-5 is that the Ex-
change Act was probably motivated more by concern about
manipulative practices than about fraud and deception, 131
and the SEC's regulation of manipulation is an important, if
less well-known, part of its work. However, without any at-
tention to that regulation, and in a series of cases that in-
volved conduct that no one familiar with the securities mar-
kets would think had anything to do with manipulation, the
Court explained the Exchange Act in a way that undermined
the SEC's regulatory authority.
In bringing criminal manipulation cases, the government
typically focuses on defendants who have engaged in so
much deceptive behavior beyond trading that it can prove
deception without arguing that trading practices were "ma-
nipulative."1 32 In the regulatory context, however, the focus
129 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
130 See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2(1), 102 Stat. 4677 (findings appended to 15
U.S.C. § 78u-1); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666 n.11
(1997) ("The United States additionally argues that Congress confirmed
the validity of the misappropriation theory in the Insider Trading and Se-
curities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), § 2(1), 102 Stat. 4677,
note following 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1. . . . Because we uphold the misappropri-
ation theory on the basis of § 10(b) itself, we do not address ITSFEA's sig-
nificance for cases of this genre."); Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and the
Regulation of Insider Trading, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1091 (1997).
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3)-(4) (necessity for regulation); Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) ("The 1934 Act was designed to protect
investors against manipulation of stock prices.").
132 See United States v. Offill, 666 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2011).
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is often on trading alone. Recall, for example, the trading
practice rules of Regulation M, which regulate trading in
connection with public offerings.1 33 One of the regulated
practices is stabilization, in which those making a public of-
fering buy securities during the offering to avoid disrupting
the market and causing a temporary price decline. Regula-
tion M permits stabilization, but only under certain condi-
tions. 134
The SEC's trading practice rules, including Regulation M,
are fundamental, technical securities regulations. They are
exactly the sort of rules that the Exchange Act contem-
plates-far more so than a rule like 10b-5. Indeed, it can
fairly be said that Congress created the SEC so that it would
adopt rules like these. The Exchange Act clearly contem-
plates SEC regulation of trading practices. Section 9(a)(6)
makes it unlawful to effect transactions for the purpose of
stabilizing security prices in contravention of SEC rules, 1 3 5
and section 10(a) makes it unlawful to effect short sales in
contravention of SEC rules. 1 36  However, until they were
amended in 2010, these provisions reached only transactions
in securities registered on a securities exchange. Under the
Supreme Court's stilted reading of SEC rulemaking power,
the SEC could regulate stabilization and short sales of over-
the-counter securities only if those practices are "manipula-
tive" within the meaning of section 10(b). 1 37  However, the
Supreme Court's section 10(b) cases suggest that they are
not.
In Hochfelder, the Court reinforced its conclusion that
section 10(b) requires scienter by interpreting "manipula-
133 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
134 See Regulation M Rules 101-104, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.101-04 (2013).
135 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6).
136 See id. § 78j(a).
137 SEC Rule lOb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-1 (purporting to extend sec-
tion 9(a) to all securities exempt from registration by defining the term
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in section 10(b)). Under
the Court's conception of section 10(b), however, many of the practices
prohibited by section 9(a) are not "manipulative" and the SEC has no au-
thority to define "manipulative" in section 10(b).
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tive" narrowly, suggesting that the word covers only a subset
of fraudulent conduct. 1 38 In particular, it said that "[u]se of
the word 'manipulative' is especially significant. It is and
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with se-
curities markets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or ar-
tificially affecting the price of securities."1 39
The Court's discussion of the word "manipulative" in
Hoch/elder might have been treated as dicta. However, un-
der its practice of deciding Rule 10b-5 cases by focusing on
the language of section 10(b), the Court had to confront the
meaning of "manipulative" directly in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green.14 0 The plaintiff there challenged a short-form merger
under Rule 10b-5, arguing that the majority shareholder had
caused minority shareholders to be cashed out at an inade-
quate price in violation of its fiduciary duties. The Second
Circuit allowed the case to proceed, holding that Rule 10b-5
did not require deception.14 ' Thus, to decide the case, the
138 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) ("The
words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or con-
trivance' strongly suggest that § 10 (b) was intended to proscribe knowing
or intentional misconduct."); see id. at 199 ("The argument simply ignores
the use of the words 'manipulative,' 'device,' and 'contrivance' terms that
make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct
quite different from negligence.").
139 Id. at 197; id. at 203 (During committee discussion of what became
section 10(b), a spokesman for the drafters described it "rightly as a
'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to deal with new manipulative
(or cunning) devices.' It is difficult to believe that any lawyer, legislative
draftsman, or legislator would use these words if the intent was to create
liability for merely negligent acts or omissions. Neither the legislative his-
tory nor the briefs supporting respondents identify any usage or authority
for construing 'manipulative (or cunning) devices' to include negligence.");
see also id. at 199 n.21 ("Webster's International Dictionary . . . defines
'manipulate' as 'to manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to Manipu-
late accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (prices) up or down, as by
matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports . . .; to rig."' (first ellipsis
added)).
140 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
141 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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Court had to determine whether the challenged conduct was
"manipulative" even if it was not deceptive.
In Santa Fe, the Court quoted essentially everything it
had said in Hochfelder that suggested that "manipulative"
practices are a subset of "deceptive" ones.142 The Court then
concluded that "section 10(b)'s general prohibition of practic-
es deemed by the SEC to be 'manipulative'-in this technical
sense of artificially affecting market activity in order to mis-
lead investors-is fully consistent with the fundamental
purpose of the 1934 Act .. .. Thus, after Santa Fe, it ap-
peared that a practice could not be "manipulative" within the
meaning of section 10(b) unless it was designed to mislead
investors. Finally, a few years later, in a case arising under
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act,144 which forbids the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with tender
offers, the Court read Hochfelder to hold that in section 10(b)
the word "manipulative" means "conduct designed to deceive
or defraud investors."1 45
Nothing in this Article suggests that the plaintiffs should
have prevailed in any of these cases. However, by finding
that the results in Hochfelder and Santa Fe were required by
the language of section 10(b), and repeatedly holding that
the SEC's regulatory power is defined by that language, 146
the Court suggested that the SEC cannot regulate manipula-
tive trading practices unless those practices are inherently
misleading or designed to mislead investors. Lower courts in
private litigation have read the cases to mean that securities
trading alone cannot be manipulative within the meaning of
section 10(b) and have required private plaintiffs to show
some sort of deception beyond trading. 147
142 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77.
143 Id.
144 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
145 See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6 (1985).
The Court also held that the word "manipulative" in section 14(e) "re-
quires misrepresentation or nondisclosure." Id. at 12.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
147 See, e.g., GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 204-
05 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[M]arket manipulation generally refers to practices,
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The SEC's stabilization rules have always been under-
stood to be an appropriate response to manipulation-recall
that they were formerly part of the series of 10b rules.14 8
But if conduct is manipulative only if it is deceptive or de-
signed to mislead investors, it is difficult to argue that stabi-
lization, short selling, and other trading practices are ma-
nipulative (at least as the Court has defined the term).
Stabilizing trades are real and reported trades. Plans for
stabilization are fully disclosed in offering documents, and
stabilization may work best when disclosed, so that potential
purchasers will not be concerned about market disruptions.
Whether or not they are appropriate, stabilizing transactions
are not deceptive. Similarly, short-sale regulation has a long
pedigree, but short sales are not deceptive, regardless of
their value.
Surely the SEC has always had power to regulate stabili-
zation, short selling, and other manipulative trading practic-
es, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's Rule 10b-5 cases,
although those cases may have led the Commission to aban-
don the 10(b) designation when it replaced its old trading
rules with Regulation M.149 Nevertheless, in 2010, in an un-
heralded provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Congress amended section
9(a)(6) of the Exchange Act, which had previously applied on-
ly to exchange-registered securities, to make it unlawful to
affect stabilizing transactions in "any security other than a
government security" in contravention of SEC rules. 150 It al-
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.") (internal quo-
tation marks removed); Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d
857, 865 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Deception there was not; and most forms of 'ma-
nipulation' involve deception in one form or another."); Jag Media Hold-
ings, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 387 F.Supp. 2d 691, 708 (S.D. Tex.
2004); Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc., 274 F.Supp. 2d 615, 624 (D.N.J. 2003).
148 See supra text accompanying note 57.
149 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.200-03 (2013); see supra text accompanying note
57.
150 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929L (amending Exchange Act § 9(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. §
78i(a)(6) (2012)).
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so amended the rest of section 9(a) and section 10(a) to ex-
tend them to all securities other than government securi-
ties. 15 1 The amendments were necessary only because the
understanding of regulatory authority that the Supreme
Court has expressed in its section 10(b) cases is inconsistent
with the regulatory and rulemaking structure of the Ex-
change Act and left the validity of the SEC's longstanding
regulation of trading practices in question.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has determined the scope of federal
securities regulation in a series of cases in which it has read
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as either prohib-
iting certain misconduct or authorizing the SEC to regulate
that conduct and only that conduct. The Court's reading is
wrong. Section 10(b) does not prohibit anything, and it nei-
ther grants the SEC rulemaking power nor limits its rule-
making power under the Exchange Act. Judging by the lan-
guage, structure, and history of the Exchange Act, section
10(b) simply triggers criminal sanctions for certain rule vio-
lations. This is an important function, but very different
from the one the Supreme Court has ascribed to section
10(b).
151 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 762(d)(2), 929L (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)
(Supp. V 2011)); see id. § 929L(2) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)).
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